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Abstract. In this paper, we study the relationship between two models
of secure information flow: the PER model (which uses equivalence rela-
tions) and the abstract non-interference model (which uses upper closure
operators). We embed the lattice of equivalence relations into the lat-
tice of closures, re-interpreting abstract non-interference over the lattice
of equivalence relations. For narrow abstract non-interference, we show
that the new definition is equivalent to the original, whereas for abstract
non-interference it is strictly less general. The relational presentation of
abstract non-interference leads to a simplified construction of the most
concrete harmless attacker. Moreover, the PER model of abstract non-
interference allows us to derive unconstrained attacker models, which do
not necessarily either observe all public information or ignore all private
information. Finally, we show how abstract domain completeness can be
used for enforcing the PER model of abstract non-interference.
Keywords: information flow, non-interference, abstract interpretation,
language-based security.
1 Introduction
An important task of language based security is to protect confidentiality of
data manipulated by computational systems. Namely, it is important to guar-
antee that no information, about confidential/private data, can be caught by
an external viewer. In the standard approach to the confidentiality problem,
called non-interference, the characterization of attackers does not impose any
observational or complexity restriction on the attackers’ power. This means that
the attackers are all powerful : they are modeled without any limitation in their
quest to obtain confidential information. For this reason non-interference is an
extremely restrictive policy. The problem of refining these security policies is
considered as a major challenge in language-based information flow security [17].
Refining security policies means weakening standard non-interference, in such a
way that it can be used in practice. Specifically, we need a weaker notion of non-
interference where the power of the attacker (or external viewer) is bounded,
and where intentional leakage of information is allowed.
Abstract non-interference is introduced [9] for modeling the secrecy degree
of programs by means of abstract interpretation. In particular, it is possible
to characterize the observational capability of the most powerful harmless at-
tacker, that is, the most powerful attacker that cannot disclose any confiden-
tial information. Moreover, this model also allows one to characterize which
aspects of private information can flow during the execution of a given pro-
gram, when non-interference fails. These two complementary aspects of non-
interference have been proved to be adjoint transformers of semantics in [10],
where non-interference has been modeled as an abstract domain completeness
problem.
In the PER model of secure information flow [18], a generalised notion of non-
interference is obtained by using equivalence relations to model attackers. In this
paper we show that, since equivalence relations can be viewed as particular types
of closures called partitioning closures [16], the definitions of narrow and abstract
non-interference from [9] can be re-interpreted by using equivalence relations only
in place of arbitrary closures. For narrow abstract non-interference, we show
that the new definition is equivalent to the original, whereas for abstract non-
interference it is strictly less general. The difference lies in the fact that abstract
non-interference depends on being able to distinguish properties of sets of values,
such as intervals, congruences, etc, and this cannot be done with equivalence
relations on the underlying set. We then show how the relational presentation of
narrow abstract non-interference leads to a simplified construction of the most
powerful harmless attacker. Moreover, the generalization of the PER model of
secure information flow allows us to derive unconstrained attacker models, which
do not necessarily either observe all public information or ignore all private
information. Finally, we show how abstract domain completeness can be used for
enforcing the PER model of abstract non-interference, proving that abstract non-
interference corresponds to abstract domain completeness of the corresponding
partitioning closures.
2 Mathematical Background
In this paper we use the standard framework of abstract interpretation [5, 7] for
modeling the observational capability of attackers. The idea is that, instead of
observing the concrete semantics of programs, namely the values of public data,
attackers can only observe properties of public data, namely an abstract seman-
tics of the program. For this reason we model attackers by means of abstract do-
mains. Abstract domains are used for denoting properties of concrete domains,
since their mathematical structure guarantees, for each concrete element, the
existence of the best correct approximation in the abstract domain. This is due
to the fact that abstract domains are closed under the concrete greatest lower
bound. The relation between abstract and concrete domains is formalized by Ga-
lois connections (GC). In GC-based abstract interpretation the concrete domain
C and abstract domain A are often assumed to be complete lattices and are re-
lated by an abstraction map α : C → A and concretization map γ : A→ C form-
ing a GC 〈C,α, γ,A〉 [5], i.e., for any x ∈ C and y ∈ A: α(x) ≤A y ⇔ x ≤C γ(y).
When α is surjective then the GC is said to be a Galois insertion (GI) and
uniquely determines an abstract domain. Formally, the lattice of abstract in-
terpretations of C is isomorphic to the lattice uco(C) of all the upper closure
operators on C [7]. An upper closure operator ρ : C → C on a poset C is mono-
tone, idempotent, and extensive3. The dual notion of lower closure operator (lco)
is a monotone, idempotent and reductive4 map. Any closure operator is uniquely
determined by the set of its fix points ρ(C), which forms an abstract domain. If C
is a complete lattice then 〈uco(C),v,unionsq,u,>, id〉 is the lattice of upper closures,
where >
def
= λx. >, id
def
= λx. x, and for every ρ, η ∈ uco(C), {ρi}i∈I ⊆ uco(C)
and x ∈ C: ρ v η iff η(C) ⊆ ρ(C); unionsqi∈Iρi =
⋂
i∈I ρi; and ui∈Iρi =M(
⋃
i∈I ρi),
whereM is the operation of closing a domain by concrete greatest lower bound,
e.g., intersection on power domains. The disjunctive completion of an abstract
domain ρ ∈ uco(C) is the most abstract domain able to represent the concrete
disjunction of its objects:
b
(ρ) = unionsq{η ∈ uco(C)|η v ρ and η is additive}. ρ is
disjunctive (or additive) iff
b
(ρ) = ρ (cf. [7]).
2.1 Equivalence Relations vs Closure Operators
In this section we review the relationships between equivalence relations and
upper closures which are key to the development in the rest of the paper.
The lattice of equivalence relations. The equivalence relations on a set C form a
lattice 〈Eq(C),v,u,unionsq, IdC ,AllC〉, where IdC is the relation that distinguishes
all the elements in C, AllC is the relation that cannot distinguish any element
in C, and:
– Q v R iff Q ⊆ R iff x Q y ⇒ x R y;
– Q u R = Q ∩ R, i.e., x Q u R y iff x Q y ∧ x R y;
– Q unionsq R = T(Q ∪ R), where x Q ∪ R y iff x Q y ∨ x R y.
Here T(S) is the transitive closure of the relation S (it is easily seen that both ∪
and T preserve symmetry and reflexivity).
Relating equivalence relations and upper closures. In this paper we will generally
be concerned with relationships between equivalence relations on a set C and
3 ∀x ∈ C. x ≤C ρ(x).
4 ∀x ∈ C. x ≥C ρ(x).
upper closure operators on the powerset ℘(C). However, we start by observing
the following strong correspondence between ucos (on any lattice) and their own
kernels. (Recall that the kernel, Kf , of a function f : C → D, is the equivalence
relation on C defined by x Kf y iff f(x) = f(y).)
Lemma 1. Let η, ρ ∈ uco(C). Then η v ρ iff Kη v Kρ.
Next, we recall that there exists an isomorphism between equivalence rela-
tions and a subclass of the upper closure operators [16]. In fact, this isomorphism
arises from a Galois connection between Eq(C) and uco(℘(C)). For each equiv-
alence relation on a set C, R ⊆ C × C, we can define an upper closure operator
on ℘(C), CloR ∈ uco(℘(C)), and vice versa, from each upper closure operator
η ∈ uco(℘(C)) we can define an equivalence relation Relη ⊆ C × C.
Consider an upper closure operator η ∈ uco(℘(C)). We define Relη ⊆ C ×C,
as ∀x, y ∈ C . x Relη y ⇔ η({x}) = η({y}). Proving that Relη is an equivalence
relation is immediate and doesn’t depend on the fact that η is a uco, but only
on the fact that it is a function.
Consider now an equivalence relation R ⊆ C×C. We define CloR ∈ uco(℘(C))




CloR is obtained by disjunctive completion of the partition induced by R. Proving
that CloR is an upper closure operator is immediate. In particular idempotence
derives directly from the fact that R is an equivalence relation.
In [16], CloR is identified as the most concrete uco η such that R = Relη. More
precisely:
Proposition 2. Let C be any set.
1. The mappings defined above form a Galois connection between the lattice of
equivalence relations on C and the lattice of upper closure operators on its
powerset. That is, for all R ∈ Eq(C), η ∈ uco(℘(C)): CloR v η ⇔ R v Relη.
2. For all R ∈ Eq(C), RelClo
R
= R.
Corollary 3. Let Π(η) be defined by Π(η) = CloRel
η
.
1. Π : uco(℘(C))→ uco(℘(C)) is a lower closure operator.
2. For all η ∈ uco(℘(C)), Π(η) is the (unique) most concrete closure that
induces the same equivalence relation as η (Relη = RelΠ(η)).
The fix points of Π are termed the partitioning closures [16].
Proposition 4. An upper closure operator η ∈ uco(℘(C)) is partitioning, i.e.,
η = Π(η), iff it is complemented, namely if ∀X ∈ η. X
def
= C rX ∈ η.
Indeed, an upper closure operator η is always closed under glb (intersection
in this context), therefore whenever it is closed also under complementation, we
have that it is surely disjunctive, by De Morgan’s laws. In the following we have
an example of the partitioning closure associated with a partition.










by a closure 
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partitioning closure 
Fig. 1. A partitioning closure.
Example 5. Consider the set Σ = {1, 2, 3, 4} and one of its possible partitions
pi = {{1}, {2, 3}, {4}}, then the closure η with fix points {∅, {1}, {4}, {123}, Σ}
induces exactly pi as partition of states, but the most concrete closure that
induces pi is Clopi = Π(η) =
b
({∅, {1}, {2, 3}, {4}}, Σ), which is the closure on
the right in Fig. 1.
On the closures we have the following characterizations. Note that, since Π
is a lower closure operator on uco(℘(C)), then unionsq in Eq coincides with unionsq in uco,
whereas CloQuR can be strictly less than CloQ u CloR.
Proposition 6. Q v R iff CloQ v CloR, Q u R = RelClo
Q




3 Information Flows in Language-based Security
In the rest of this paper, confidential data are considered private, labeled with
H (high level of secrecy), while all other data are public, labeled with L (low
level of secrecy). Non-interference can be naturally expressed by using semantic
models of program execution (this idea goes back to Cohen’s work on strong de-
pendency [3]). Non-interference for programs essentially means that “a variation
of confidential (high or private) input does not cause a variation of public (low)
output” [17]. When this happens, we say that the program has only secure in-
formation flows [1, 3, 8, 13]. This situation has been modeled by considering the
denotational (input/output) semantics JP K of the program P . Program states in
Σ are functions (represented as tuples) mapping variables into the set of values
V. If T ∈ {H, L}, n = |{x ∈ Var(P )|x : T}|, and v ∈ Vn, we abuse notation by
denoting v ∈ VT the fact that v is a possible value for the variables with security
type T. Moreover, we assume that any input s, can be seen as a pair (h, l), where
sH = h is a value for private data and sL = l is a value for public data. In this
case, (standard) non-interference can be formulated as follows.
A program P is secure if ∀ input s, t. sL = tL ⇒ (JP K(s))L = (JP K(t))L
This definition has been formulated also as a Partial Equivalence Relation (PER)
[18]. The standard methods for checking non-interference are based on security-
type systems and data-flow/control-flow analysis. Type-based approaches are
designed in such a way that well typed programs do not leak secrets. In a security-
typed language, a type is inductively associated at compile time with program
statements in such a way that any statement showing a potential flow disclosing
secrets is rejected [19, 21]. Similarly, data-flow/control-flow analysis techniques
are devoted to statically discover flows of secret data into public variables [2, 13,
15, 18]. All these approaches are characterized by the way they model attackers
(or unauthorized users).
3.1 Abstract Non-Interference: Attack Models
The notion of abstract non-interference [9] is introduced for modeling both
weaker attack models, and declassification. The idea is that an attacker can
observe only some properties, modeled as abstract interpretations of program
semantics, of public concrete values. The model of an attacker , also called at-
tacker , is therefore a pair of abstractions 〈η, ρ〉, with η, ρ ∈ uco(℘(VL)), rep-
resenting what an observer can see about, respectively, the input and output
of a program. The notion of narrow (abstract) non-interference (NNI), denoted
[η]P (ρ), is given in Table 1. It says that if the attacker is able to observe the
property η of public input, and the property ρ of public output, then no informa-
tion flow concerning the private input is observable from the public output. The
problem with this notion is that it introduces deceptive flows [9], generated by
different public output due to different public input with the same η property.
Consider, for instance, the program l := l ∗ h2 and an observer who can observe
only the parity of l on input and its sign on output. Intuitively, we may say
that no information flows from h, since the sign of l after the assignment does
not reveal anything about the value of h. However, [Par]l := l ∗ h2(Sign) does
not hold5, since there is variation of the output’s sign due to the existence of
both negative and positive even numbers. In order to avoid deceptive flows we
introduce a weaker notion of non-interference, which considers as public input
the set of all the elements sharing the same property η. Hence, in the previous
example, the observable output for l is the set of all the elements with the same
parity, e.g., if Par(l) = even then we check the sign of
{
l ∗ h2
∣∣ l is even } which
is always unknown, since an even number can be both positive and negative,
while h2 does not interfere with the final sign. Moreover, we consider also a
property φ ∈ uco(℘(VH)), modeling the private property that has not to be ob-
served by the attacker 〈η, ρ〉. This notion, denoted (η)P (φ []ρ), is called abstract
non-interference (ANI) and is defined in Table 1. So for example the property
5 Here Par
def
= {>, ev, od,⊥} and Sign
def
= {>, 0+,−,⊥}.
[η]P (ρ) if ∀h1, h2 ∈ V
H,∀l1, l2 ∈ V
L . η({l1}) = η({l2}) ⇒ ρ({JP K(h1, l1)
L}) = ρ({JP K(h2, l2)
L})
(η)P (φ []ρ) if ∀h1, h2 ∈ V
H,∀l ∈ VL . ρ(JP K(φ({h1}), η({l}))
L) = ρ(JP K(φ({h2}), η({l}))
L)
Table 1. Narrow and Abstract Non-Interference.
(id)l := l∗h2(Sign []Sign) is satisfied, since the public result’s sign do not depend
on the private input sign, which is kept secret.
Note that [id]P (id) models exactly (standard) non-interference. Moreover, we
have that abstract non-interference is a weakening of both standard and narrow
non-interference: [id]P (id) ⇒ (η)P (φ []ρ) and [η]P (ρ) ⇒ (η)P (φ []ρ), while
standard non-interference is not stronger than the narrow version, due to de-
ceptive flows. In [9], two methods are provided for deriving the most concrete
output observation for a program, given the input one, for both NNI and ANI.
In particular the idea is to collect in the same abstract object all the elements
that, if distinguished, would generate a visible flow. These most concrete output
observations, unable to get information from the program P observing η in in-
put, are, respectively, denoted [η]JP K(id) and (η)JP K(φ []id), both in uco(℘(VL)).
Hence, if for instance P
def
= l := |l| ∗ Sign(h) (where | · | is the absolute value), we
note that each value n has to be abstracted together with its opposite −n, in
order not to generate visible flows, hence the most concrete harmless attacker
can at most observe the absolute value Abs, i.e., [Abs]JP K(id) = Abs.
3.2 PER Model
The semantic approach described above has also been equivalently formalized
in [18], by using partial equivalence relations (PER) to model dependencies in
programs. As we noted above, the problem of non-interference can be seen as
absence of dependencies among data, where the meaning of dependency is given
in [3]. The idea behind this characterization consists in interpreting security
types as partial equivalence relations. In particular the type H is interpreted by
using the equivalence relation All , and L by using the relation Id . The intuition
is that All and Id model, respectively, that the user has no access to the high
information and has full access to the low information. This perspective can
simply be generalized to multilevel security problems.
In order to use this model in the security framework we need to combine
equivalence relations on simple domains to construct new relations on more
complex domains, in particular product spaces and function spaces. For the
latter, it turns out to be natural to generalise slightly to consider partial equiv-
alence relations, that is, relations which are symmetric and transitive but not
necessarily reflexive. Let Per(D) be the set of partial equivalence relations on
D. Given P ∈ Per(D) and Q ∈ Per(E) we define (P _ Q) ∈ Per(D → E) and
(P× Q) ∈ Per(D × E) as follows:
1. f (P_ Q) g ⇔ ∀x, x′ ∈ D . x P x′ ⇒ f(x) Q g(x′)
2. 〈x, y〉 P× Q 〈x′, y′〉 ⇔ x P x′ ∧ y Q y′.
In general, for P ∈ Per(D) and x ∈ D, we write x : P to mean x P x. In particular,
if f (P_ Q) f , we write f : P _ Q. Note that P _ Q will not, in general, be
reflexive, even when P and Q are (for example, All _ Id relates only functions
which are equal and constant).
At this point, we can formalize security in this model.
Definition 7. [18] A program P is said to be secure iff ∀s, t . 〈sH, sL〉 All × Id
〈tH, tL〉 ⇒ JP K(s) All × Id JP K(t), or, more concisely: JP K : All×Id _ All×Id.
4 PER Model vs Abstract Non-Interference
The correspondence existing between ucos and equivalence relations suggests
that we can define particular notions of abstract non-interference where the clo-
sures modeling properties are all partitioning, i.e., correspond exactly to equiv-
alence relations. As shown below, for NNI this specialisation makes essentially
no difference, while for ANI it does involve a loss of generality.
First of all we introduce the natural generalization of the PER model pro-
vided in [18]. Given a program P and relations Q, W ∈ Eq(V), we say that P is
〈Q, W〉-secure iff JP K : Q _ W. Clearly, P is secure (Definition 7) just when it is
〈All × Id ,All × Id〉-secure.
4.1 PER Model vs NNI
Proposition 8. Let P be a deterministic program. Let η, ρ ∈ uco(℘(VL)). Then:
1. [η]P (ρ) iff JP K : All × Relη _ All × Relρ
2. [η]P (ρ) iff [Π(η)]P (Π(ρ))
Proof. Part 1 is immediate from the definitions. Part 2 follows from part 1 by
part 2 of Corollary 3. uunionsq
Since every equivalence relation R is represented exactly by the uco CloR, this
result shows that precisely the same class of NNI properties can be expressed
using equivalence relations or partitioning closures as using arbitrary ucos. In
particular, we may define NNI directly in terms of equivalence relations:
Definition 9. Let P be a program. Let R, S ∈ Eq(VL). Then P is said to be
〈R, S〉-NSecret, written [R]P (S), iff JP K : All × R_ All × S.
By Proposition 8, all NNI properties may be written in this form.
4.2 PER Model vs ANI
To compare the relative expressive power of the PER model and the general no-
tion of abstract non-interference using arbitrary ucos, it is helpful to consider the
extension of a relation on C to a relation on subsets of C. The basic construction
is that used in defining Plotkin’s powerdomain.
Definition 10. Let R be a binary relation on a set C. Then the extension of R
to ℘(C) is the relation P [R] ⊆ ℘(C)× ℘(C) such that X P [R] Y iff
∀x ∈ X. ∃y ∈ Y . x R y and ∀y ∈ Y. ∃x ∈ X . x R y
For a partitioning closure, the extension of its corresponding equivalence relation
from C to ℘(C) has a particularly simple characterisation:
Proposition 11. Let C be any set and let η ∈ uco(℘(C)) be partitioning. Then
P [Relη] =Kη, that is: X P [Rel
η] Y ⇔ η(X) = η(Y ).
Corollary 12. Let η, φ ∈ uco(℘(VL)) and let ρ ∈ uco(℘(VH)). If ρ is partition-
ing, then (η)P (φ []ρ) iff
∀X1, X2 ∈ V
H/Relφ, ∀Y ∈ VL/Relη . JP K(X1, Y ) P [All × Relρ] JP K(X2, Y )
The following proposition shows that, in contrast to NNI, there are ANI
properties which cannot be expressed using the partitioning closures alone.
Proposition 13. Let P be a program, let η, φ ∈ uco(℘(VL)) and ρ ∈ uco(℘(VH)).
Then (Π(η))P (Π(φ) []Π(ρ))⇒ (η)P (φ []ρ) but, in general, the reverse implica-
tion does not hold.
The following example shows where the difference between the two notions lies.
Example 14. Consider the following program fragment:
P
def
= if h = 0 then l := l mod 6 + 2; else if l < 0 then l := 2 else l := 7;
with security typing h : H, l : L. Consider η
def
= {>, 2Z, 2Z + 1,⊥} for parity,
φ = {>, 0+,−,⊥} for sign, and ρ
def
= Int of intervals [5], in uco(℘(Z)). Note that,
since each integer number is in particular an interval, we have that Π(Int) = id,
distinguishing all the integer values, while Π(η) = η and Π(φ) = φ. Let us see
what happens in abstract non-interference. Consider η(l) = 2Z, then if φ(h) =
0+ we have that ρ(JP K(φ(h), η(l))L) = ρ({2, 4, 6, 7}) = [2, 7]. While, if φ(h) = −,
then we have ρ(JP K(φ(h), η(l))L) = ρ({2, 7}) = [2, 7]. On the other hand, if η(l) =
2Z + 1 and φ(h) = 0+, then ρ(JP K(φ(h), η(l))L) = ρ({2, 3, 5, 7}) = [2, 7], and
when φ(h) = − we have ρ(JP K(φ(h), η(l))L) = ρ({2, 7}) = [2, 7]. So (η)P (φ []ρ)
holds. Consider now Π(ρ) = id. It is clear that if we substitute above ρ with id,
then we have that (Π(η))P (Π(φ) []Π(ρ)) does not hold. uunionsq
Hence, ANI with ucos is a more precise notion whenever we have to deal with sets
of values, instead of with singletons. This may be particularly useful, for example,
for non-deterministic systems, where the denotational semantics returns a set of
states as output.
5 Deriving Attacker Models by Abstract Interpretation
In this section we consider the PER model of NNI and use it to derive simple,
constructive characterisations of various classes of attacker considered in [9]. For
example, suppose given a class of attackers whose power to observe low security
inputs is given by R: for a given program P , what is the most powerful attacker
in the class (with respect to observation of low security outputs), for which P is
secure? There are two cases of principal interest:
1. Most powerful attacker: given R ∈ Eq(VL), is there a smallest S ∈ Eq(VL)
such that [R]P (S)? Or, given S ∈ Eq(VL), is there a greatest R ∈ Eq(VL) such
that [R]P (S)?
2. Fix point (canonical) attacker: is there a smallest R such that [R]P (R)?
The particular interest of fix point attackers is that, in many situations, the
power of the attacker to observe low security data may be independent of the
data’s roˆle as input or output.
5.1 Deriving unconstrained attackers
In this section, given a semantics f and an input [output] equivalence relation R
[S], we show how we can derive the most concrete [abstract] output [input] rela-
tion S [R] that makes the program satisfy f : R_ S. Consider an arbitrary func-
tion f : A→ B between sets. As is well known, any such f lifts to an adjunction
between ℘(A) and ℘(B), in the form of f ’s direct and inverse image mappings. It
turns out that f can be lifted to an adjunction 〈Eq(A), f̂ , f̂−1,Eq(B)〉 between
lattices of equivalence relations in a similar way. In this section we detail the
construction of f̂ and f̂−1, and we go onto show how they are used to derive
attackers.
Given an output relation S it is always possible to find a good candidate for
input relation R, essentially by simply imposing the condition f : R_ S. In other
words we can always define the equivalence relation f̂−1(S) in the following way:
x f̂−1(S) y iff f(x) S f(y) (1)
This is the key definition in [14] and is also exactly the idea used in [22] on the
trace semantics, namely we collect together all the elements whose semantics are
equivalent in the output observation6.
6 This transformation corresponds to the quotient of the concrete semantic domain
with respect to the property CloS [4]
Lemma 15. f̂−1(S) is an equivalence relation and f : R_ S⇔ R v f̂−1(S).
Note that for each S we have f̂−1(S) w Kf . This means that the input relation
has, at least, to identify all the elements with the same image under f . This
observation makes the definition of f̂ a bit more complicated. Indeed, given R,
we would like to find the best relation S which satisfies f : R _ S. A naive
construction leads to the function f˜ : Rel(C)→ Rel(C), as follows:
y f˜(R) y′ iff (∃x, x′ . x R x′ and f(x) = y, f(x′) = y′ ∨ y = y′)
Note that the disjunct y = y′ guarantees that the relation is reflexive. However,
f˜(R) may fail to be transitive, as we can see in the following example.
Example 16. Consider a domain C = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and a function f such that
f(1) = 1, f(3) = f(4) = 2, f(2) = f(6) = 5 and f(5) = 3, and suppose that
R = {[1, 3], [2, 4], [5, 6]}, then we would have 1f˜(R)2, 2f˜(R)5 and 5f˜(R)3, but for
example 1¬f˜(R)3.
The problem is that f is not injective (Kf 6= Id) and therefore, in the example
the fact that f(3) = f(4) while R distinguishes 3 from 4, creates the problems.
Proposition 17. Consider f : C → C and R ∈ Eq(C). If Kf v R, then f˜(R) is
an equivalence relation, if Kf = R, then f˜(R) = Id.
We would like to modify f˜ in order to guarantee that f˜(R) is always an
equivalence relation. For this reason we prove the following result.
Proposition 18. Let f : A→ B. Then f̂−1 : Eq(B)→ Eq(A) is co-additive.
This means that f̂−1 is the right adjoint of a Galois connection. Thus we can






∣∣∣R v f̂−1(Q) } (2)
The co-additivity of f̂−1 guarantees that the element uniquely exists. We ma-
nipulate this set obtaining that f̂(R) =
d{
Q
∣∣x R y ⇒ f(x) Q f(y) }.
Theorem 19. f̂(R) = f˜(R unionsq Kf ) = T(f˜(R)).
This means that, when R w Kf , then f˜(R) = f̂(R).
By construction, the following result is straightforward:
Proposition 20. 〈Eq(A), f̂ , f̂−1,Eq(B)〉 is a Galois connection. That is, for all
R ∈ Eq(A), S ∈ Eq(B): f̂(R) v S⇔ R v f̂−1(S).
Combining Proposition 20 with Lemma 15, gives:
Theorem 21. f : R_ S ⇔ f̂(R) v S ⇔ R v f̂−1(S).
This result shows which is the roˆle of the two operators f̂ and f̂−1 in the whole
construction. Indeed, by Theorem 21 we have that f satisfies non-interference,
namely f : R_ S, iff f̂(R) v S. This means that f̂ characterizes exactly the most
concrete output relation that guarantees non-interference for f , fixed the input
relation. By the adjunction relation we can also say that f : R_ S iff R v f̂−1(S).
Thus f̂−1 characterizes the most abstract input relation that guarantees non-
interference for f , fixed the output relation. Indeed, as expected, we can always
abstract the output observation and we can always concretize the input one.
Note that [9] misses exactly a construction of the input observation that makes
a program secure, given the output one, while this is possible in this context





Fig. 2. Example of application of bf and of bf−1.
5.2 Fix point attackers
In this section we look for the characterisation of attackers that observe the same
property both in input and in output. The idea is to consider the fix points of
the unconstrained attackers derived above. Unfortunately, the most concrete and
the most abstract non trivial (different from top and identity) attacker models
do not exist as can be also verified in Fig. 3, therefore we can use the fix point
iteration simply as a possible systematic construction of canonical attackers.
Fix point of f̂−1. Note that f̂−1(>) = >, this means that the interesting case,
if it exists, is the least fix point of f̂−1 starting from Id . We know that f̂−1 is
monotone (Prop. 20), therefore the least fix point exists and can be obtained as
the limit of the iterative application of f̂−1 starting from Id , the bottom of the
lattice of relations [6, 20].
Fix point of f̂ . Note that f̂(Id) = Id , this means that we can find, if it exists,









Fig. 3. Examples of fix points.
(Prop. 20), therefore the greatest fix point exists and can be obtained as the
limit of the iterative application of f̂ starting from the element > of the lattice
of relations [6, 20].
5.3 Deriving contrained attackers
In this section, we consider attackers which are unable to observe private data,
and which can only observe properties of public data. In this way we derive
attackers for abstract non-interference [9], where the attackers are modeled by
equivalence relations instead of by closure operators.
Most Powerful Attackers. We can use f̂ to construct the most powerful attacker.
Firstly, note that it follows directly from the definitions that [R]P (S) iff pi2 ◦ JP K :
All × R _ S7. The following result is then a straightforward consequence of
Theorem 21:
Proposition 22. Let P be a program and let R ∈ Eq(VL). Then the smallest S
such that [R]P (S) is f̂(All × R), where f = pi2 ◦ JP K.
Fix Point Attackers. We wish to construct the smallest R such that:
JP K : All × R_ All × R (3)
Let FP (R)
def
= f̂(All × R), where f = pi2 ◦ JP K. Then, using Theorem 21, it is
easily verified that (3) holds iff FP (R) v R. Thus the solutions to (3) are just
the post-fix points of FP . Since FP is clearly monotone on Eq(V
L), Tarski’s fix
point theorem gives:
7 Here pi2(〈a, b〉) = b is the projection on the second component of a pair.
Proposition 23. Let P be a program and let FP : Eq(V
L)→ Eq(VL) be defined
as above. Then the smallest R such that [R]P (R) is lfp FP .
Note that this construction corresponds exactly to the characterization given
in [9] for arbitrary closures. Indeed here we collect elements, in the new relation
f̂(R), iff they are images by f of elements that are in the input relation. In [9] the
elements are collected, for obtaining the resulting closure, when they are images,
under f of inputs that differ only in the private information (which is the input
relation in ANI).
5.4 Non-interference and Completeness
In [10] it is proved that (abstract) non-interference can be modeled as a prob-
lem of completeness in the standard framework of abstract interpretation. Since
partitions are particular closure operators, we can use completeness also for the
PER model of abstract non-interference. We would like to understand how com-
pleteness can be helpful in order to obtain non-interference. First of all let us
consider a new characterization of completeness.
Theorem 24. Given ρ1, ρ2 ∈ uco(℘(C)), and
f : C → C, then 〈ρ1, ρ2〉 is complete for f ,
i.e., ρ2 ◦ f ◦ ρ1 = ρ2 ◦ f iff ∀X ∈ ρ1.∃Y ∈ ρ2




At this point let us define completeness of equivalence relations in terms of
completeness of the corresponding closure operators. Let R, S ∈ Eq(C), and f a
map on C: S◦f ◦R = S◦f iff CloS ◦f ◦CloR = CloS ◦f .
Corollary 25. f : R_ S iff S◦f ◦R = S◦f .
(It is interesting to note that precisely this relationship was used in [12] to
establish a correspondence between PER-based and projection-based program
analyses. It holds generally for idempotent maps and their kernels.)
This means that we can use the constructive method given in [11] for making
abstract domains complete. Clearly the result of this transformation need not be
a partitioning closure, hence we have then to derive the partition associated with
the complete domain. In this way we obtain a method for making equivalence
relations complete.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we define abstract non-interference in terms of the PER model.
In particular, we consider equivalence relations instead of arbitrary abstract
domains. We show that the notion does not change for narrow non-interference,
while it becomes less general when we consider abstract non-interference. And
it is possible to show that, even if we lift PERs to sets then we cannot reach the
generality of uco since lifted PERs correspond only to additive closures. The use
of equivalence relations allows us to simplify the characterization of the most
powerful harmless attacker. Moreover we can also derive distinguished attackers
for the generic PER model of security (〈Q, W〉-security, Sect. 4).
Finally, we show that the PER model of abstract non-interference can be
rewritten as an abstract domain completeness problem. This result is interesting
for us since it suggests how we may approach the problem of making partitioning
closures complete, similarly to what is done in [11]. Such a result could be useful
also in other fields of computer science, such as completeness in model checking
[16]. In this paper we only provide the relation-based construction of the most
powerful harmless attacker for the narrow case, which is the straightforward
generalization of the PER model [18]. It could be interesting to investigate if
the restriction to partitioning closures simplifies also the characterization of the
harmless attacker for abstract non-interference.
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